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SUMMARY 
Information relating to aircraft fires has been reviewed to 
determine what new or further reeearch might lead to a substantial 
reduction of the aircraft fire hazard in flight and following 
crashes. An examination of fuels, lubricants, and hydraulic fluids 
as inflammable liquids is presented herein, together with possible 
sources of ignition under the general categories of hot surfaces, 
electric sparks and arcs, flames, and hot gases. The literature 
on these topics is extensive and a number of organizations are 
currently engaged in research and development activities on the air-
craft fire problem. 
A review of the statistics on aircraft accidents shows that 
about 15 percent of all air-carrier accidents are crashes followed 
by fire and about 5 percent of all accidents are caused by fire in 
flight. In 1946, crash fires caused approximately 70 of 251 deaths 
in air-carrier aCCidents, and fires in flight were responsible for 
22 deaths. 
From the existing information, it might be concluded that 
major reductions in the aircraft fire hazard could be achieved by 
the use of low-volatility fuel with inerted fuel tanks, noninflammable 
lubricant, and noninflammable hydraulic fluid. Conclusive demonstra-
tion of the apparent benefits in safety to be derived from low-
volatility fuel appears necessary, and serviceability must be 
achieved in the engines that will use a low-volatility fuel to at 
least the same degree that now exists with aircraft engines. 
Extensive research and development must proceed before a satis-
factory noninflammable lubricant will be achieved. Noninflammable 
hydraulic fluids are being developed and their effective utilization 
should be hastened. 
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The phenomena of fire extinguishment are incompletely under-
stood and should be studied. Adequate methods of detecting fire or 
combustibles require further development. 
There are many existing and potential ignition sources on an 
aircraft. In order to establish the appropriate remedial measures 
involving these- ignition sources, knowledge on the exact nature of 
the start and propagation of fires in aircraft must be extended. 
Information shows that the exhaust system may be the single most 
dangerous ignition source, particularly in a crash or during a 
major engine failure, and methods for redUCing exhaust-system tem-
peratures should therefore be investigated. 
The ultimate reduction of the fire hazard will not result from 
the application of any single 1lnprovement, but will came from an 
integration into the airplane design and operation of new ideas and 
methods, many of which remain to be explored. 
INTROLUCTION 
The loss of nearly 100 lives attributed to fire in air-
carrier accidents during 1946 and a similar high toll during 1947 
clearly designates the need for minimizing existing aircraft fire 
hazards. Steady progress in learning methods of prevention, 
detection, confinement, and extinguishment of aircraft fires, 
particularly in flight, has been made during recent years as a 
result of the leadership and efforts of the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration and the work sponsored and conducted by the Army 
Air Forces, the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department, the 
aircraft and allied industries, the Nat~onal Fire Protection 
ASSOCiation, and the universities. Many of the methods resulting 
from the combined efforts of these groups are in use. 
The urgency of the need to accelerate the rate at which 
aircraft fire hazards are minimized, however, is evident and can 
presumably be aChieved by both supporting and augmenting the 
existing programs. An investigation of methods for reducing air-
craft fire hazards has therefore been initiated at the NACA 
Cleveland laboratory. 
The first phase of the investigation has been a study and a 
review by laboratory personnel from Flight, Combustion, and Fuels 
Branches of information relating to aircraft fires to determine 
those areas in which substantial reduct ion of the aircraft fire 
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hazard might result from an extension of existing information or 
from an exploration of new ideas. A preliminary presentation of the 
panel study is given in this report. 
Considering the many factors involved in the occurrence of air-
craft fires in flight or following crash, it is obvious that the 
task of predicting occasions when fires will or will not result is 
a somewhat hopeless task. The airplane in flight with its complex 
internal systems contains many potential ignition sources that are 
dangerously close to large quantities of inflammable liquid. This 
situation is obviously aggravated considerably in a crash by virtue 
of the release of inflammable liquids, the formation of inflammable 
mixtures, and the presence of various individual sources of ignition. 
The solution to the problem of eliminating or reducing the fires 
that occur in flight or after crash can, therefore, best be 
approached from study of two essential factors involved, namely, 
combustible mixtures and ignition sources. 
Specifically, this report presents an examination of fuels, 
lubricants, and hydraulic fluids as inflammable liquids together 
with possible sources of ignition under the general categories of 
hot surfaces, electric sparks and arcs, flames, and hot gases. 
Emphasis is placed on conditions that may exist in an aircraft after 
a crash or in flight. 
Literature bearing on the known facts of inflammable liquids 
and ignition sources and on the relations between inflammable liquids 
and ignition sources is quite extensive and serves as a sound basis 
for an examination of the fire problem. As in all problems involving 
numerous intangible variables, an exact analysis of the fire problem 
has not been and probably cannot be made. The broad range of subject 
matter dealing with specific remedial action, such as the effect of 
details of airplane design on the susceptibility of an airplane to 
fire and methods of fire ext1nb~ishing are not discussed in detail. 
These subjects will be studied in greater detail as the work 
progresses. In the discussion an effort has been made to generalize 
some of the pertinent information regarding inflammable liquids and 
ignition sources and to suggest lines of new or augmented research 
activity that should aid in minimizing the aircraft fire hazard. 
An examination of the statistics on aircraft accidents is also 
included in this report. The statistics point out the magnitude of 
the fire problem as a whole and can be used to establish the relative 
importance of fire during ground operation, fire during flight, and 
fire follOwing a crash. 
------- --- --~~ J 
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STATISTICS ON AIRCRAFT FIRES 
Aircraft accident statistics were reviewed and analyzed in 
order to determine the frequency with which aircraft fires occur 
as compared with other aircraft accidents and to determine whether 
fire during ground operation, flight operation, or following a crash 
is responsible for the most fatalities. A comparison of these 
results would then indicate which parts of the aircraft fire 
problem should receive the maximum research effort. 
A study of the 121 United States air-carrier accidents that 
occurred during 1946 (reference 1) shows that 22, or lS percent, 
of these accidents involved fire. The Army Air Forces in a survey 
of 3635 of their accidents within continental United States (ref-
erences 2 and 3) found that fire was a factor in 15 percent. These 
two percentages agree reasonably well, and thus it appears that at 
the present time, fire will be either the cause or the result in 
approximately one-fifth of all air-carrier accidents. 
The problem of aircraft fires can be divided into three parts: 
fire' during ground operation; fire during flight operation; and, 
fire following a crash. An analysis of the 11 taxiing accidents 
listed in reference 1 shows that there were no injuries or 
fatalities during ground operation and that no fires were involved. 
This result indicates that fires during ground operation are of 
minor importance from the standpoint of passengers and personnel. 
Fires in the air and fires following crash are therefore the two 
major problems. The British in their analysis of the problem have 
reached the same conclusion (reference 4). 
During the calendar year of 1946, approximately 5 percent 
(6/121) of all air-carrier accidents were caused by fire in the 
air. This value agrees well with the results of the Air Force 
survey given in references 2 and 3; 4 percent of their accidents 
in 1944 and 5 percent in 1945 were attributed to fire in flight. 
In the six air-carrier accidents or forced landings caused by fire 
in the air during 1946, 22 out of the 120 people involved were 
killed, a fatality rate of approximately 18 percent. In an analysis 
of data collected from January 1, 1938 to July 1, 1944, McFarland 
(reference 5) found a fatality rate of 26 percent due to fires in 
flight. Based on these statistics, the average fatality rate in 
fire-in-flight accidents may be as high as 25 percent. If it is 
assumed that the 5 percent of airplanes experiencing fire in flight 
carry 5 percent of the passengers, approximately 1.S percent of all 
passengers involved in accidents are killed because of fire in 
flight. 
-- --~- - --
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The 1946 air-carrier accidents also show that ~ire ~ollowed 
approximately 13 percent o~ all the accidents. The Air Force data 
given 10 re~erences 2 and 3 indicate that 11 percent o~ their 
accidents within continental United States were ~ollowed by ~ires, 
which sUbstantiates the percentage found ~or commercial accidents. 
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It may thus be assumed that no more than 15 percent o~ all accidents 
are crashes followed by fire. The percentages of fires in flight and 
following crashes are compared with all other accidents in figure 1. 
In determining fatalities chargeable to fire following a crash, 
accidents involving fire in flight, taxiing, ground operation, and 
gusts were first excluded from consideration. Tbe remaining acci-
dents were divided into two general groups; accidents followed by 
fire and accidents not followed by fire. The fatality rate of each 
group was determined and the d1fference between them and their ratio 
to one another can be used as measures of the number of people that 
were killed by fires following crashes. 
Tbe fatality rate of an accident is largely dependent upon its 
severity; therefore, the average severity of the two groups must be 
equal if a comparison of their fatality rates is to be valid. Two 
measures of crash severity are possible; the damage done to the air-
plane and the number of fatalities experienced. Analyses based on 
both measures were made and the results are presented for comparison 
in the follOWing table. The specific accident data upon which each 
of the analyses is based are presented in tables I to IV. 
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Fatality rates, (percent) 
Accident Fire No fire Charge- Ratio of 
severity follow- follow- able to fatality 
bases ing ing fire rates 
crash crash (fire/no fire) 
Accidents severe 
enough to com-
pletely wash 
out airplane 65 24 41 2.7 
Accidents having 
at least one 
fatality 75 44 31 1.7 
Accidents having 
fatalities up 
to two-thirds 
of people 
involved 25 12 13 2.1 
Accidents having 
at least one 
fated! ty 6Ild at 
least one 
survivor 40 12 28 3.3 
The table indicates that an average of about 30 percent of 
the people involved in fire-following-crash accidents are killed 
by the fire. The ratios show that from two to three times as many 
people are killed in accidents followed by fire than are killed 
when no fire follows the accident. 
1 In analyzing aircraft-fire data covering a ~year period, 
McFarland (reference 5) found a 79-percent fatality rate when fire 
followed crashes and a 50-percent fatality rate in crashes not 
followed by fire. This analysis indicates a fatality rate of 
29 percent chargeable to crash fires, or a fatality-rate ratio of 1.6. 
Furthermore, the analysis of data submitted by letter from the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration to the NACA resulted in a fatality-rate 
ratio of 1.7. These values agree well with the results presented 
in the preceding table for accidents having at least one fatality. 
If' it is assumed that the 15 percent of airplanes that burned 
- -, -, - - - - - - --- - - ---- ---------- -----------
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following crashes carried 15 percent of the passengers, approximately 
4.5 percent of all persons involved in air-carrier accidents were 
killed by fire that followed the crash. This fatality rate indicates 
that approximately 70 lives could have been saved in 1946 if all fires 
follOwing crashes could have been prevented. A graphic canparison 
of the fatality rates attributed to fires with total fatalities in 
1946 is shown in figure 2. 
To summarize briefly, the statistics indicate that app~oximately 
1.5 percent of the passengers involved in accidents were killed as 
a direct result of fire in the air and that approximately 4.5 percent 
were killed by fire following a crash. From the standpoint of fatali-
ties, fires following crashes thus appear to be the more important 
problem at the present t :Une. 
Although statistics for 1947 are not yet available, preliminary 
estimates indicate that the actual fatalities due to fire will be 
higher than for 1946. 
CIIARACTERISTICS OF COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS 
CARRIED IN AlRCRAFl' 
Fuel and Lubricating Oil 
Pertinent combustible liquid characteristics. - Two combustible 
liquid properties of interest insofar as fire hazards are concerned 
are flash point and spontaneous-ignition temperature (sometimes 
called autoignition temperature). The flash point of a combustible 
liquid can be defined as the temperature to which the liquid must 
be heated in order to give off sufficient vapor to form an 
inflammable mixture with air. In laboratory test procedures the 
spontaneous-ignition temperature is defined as the lowest tempera-
ture of a surface on which a cambustible vapor-air mixture will 
ignite after a specified time delay. 
Flash points of petroleum products vary over a wide range with 
the more volatile gasolines and naphthas flashing at temperatures 
considerably below 00 F, kerosenes in the range fram 1000 to 1600 F, 
and lubricating oils in the range between 2750 and 6500 F (refer-
ence 6). It is therefore apparent that the less volatile liquids 
must be heated to higher temperatures in order to produce inflam-
mable vapors. Data from references 7 to 10, which substantiate this 
relation, are presented in figure 3. This figure shows that liquids 
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having high boiling points also have high flash pointe, but low Reid 
vapor pressures (a measure of volatility). Equations for the two 
curves shown are as follows: 
where 
tf flash point, ~ 
t f = 0.69 t lO - 126 
= 2102 + 33,100 
log P-17.7 
tlO 10-percent A.S.T.M. distillation point, ~ 
P Reid vapor pressure, lb/sq in. 
(1) 
(2) 
The 10-percent point 18 shown on the abscissa of figure 3 in 
order to make the chart applicable to gasolines as well as pure 
hydrocarbons. An A.S.T.M. distillation curve (A.S.T.M. method D 86-40) 
for an aviation gasoline is shown in figure 4. The la-percent point 
refers to the temperature at which 10 percent of the gasoline has 
been evaporated in a specified laboratory apparatus under controlled 
conditions. Pure hydrocarbons have flat distillation curves; that 
is, over the whole range of evaporation the temperature is constant. 
Consequently, for pure hydrocarbons, lO-percent point and boiling 
points may be used interchangeably. 
The flash points of fuels will vary with altitude, as shown in 
figure 5. The relation shown in this figure is developed from the 
following equation (reference 11) and data presented in figure 6. 
tf - tl = 8 + 0.024 tlo 
where 
tl temperature of lean explosive limit, ~ 
The slopes of the lines in figure 5 are slightly higher than 
indicated by actual data presented in figure 3. 
For all practical purposes, the flash point determined under 
sea-level conditions provides a satisfactory index of the tendency 
of a combustible liquid to form combustible mixtures with air 
(fig. 5). On this basis alone, it is justifiable to assume that a 
desirable fuel from the standpoint of fire hazard should have.aa 
, 
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high a flash point as possible, consistent with the pertinent factors 
involved in the applicability of such a fuel to aircraft. 
Unfortunately, however, the aforementioned spontaneous-ignition 
temperature behaves in a manner opposite to that of flash point 
(fig. 7). With this fact in mind, it can be seen that a fuel with 
a high flash point may show a decreased tendency to form combustible 
fuel-air mixtures that can be ignited by an external source, but at 
the same time the fuel may have such a low spontaneous-ignition tem-
perature that ignition can occur by contact between fuel vapors and 
a moderately hot surface. 
This does not mean that a commercial fuel blend having a high 
flash point will necessarily have a low spontaneous-ignition temper-
ature. In fact, commercial low-volatility fuels (boiling 
rang~3000-400o F) have both high flash points and high spontaneous-
ignition temperatures because many hydrocarbons with high spontaneous-
ignition temperatures are contained in such fuels in order to meet 
antiknock requirements. Further discussion of this point is 
presented later. 
Spontaneous-ignition temperatures reported in the literature 
(reference 8 and references 12 to 24) are not in agreement in regard 
to absolute value; however, trends determined in relation to same 
property of the fuel, such as boiling point, are very consistent. 
The lack of agreement in absolute values among investigators can be 
attributed to several factors: 
(1) Purity of liquids examined 
(2) Composition of the surfaces on which -ignition temperatures 
were determined 
(3) Condition of the surfaces on which ignition temperatures 
were determined 
(4) Method of heating surface 
(5) Shape, siZe, and orientation of surface 
(6) Fuel-air ratiO, or amount of fuel introduced 
Spontaneous-ignition temperatures for various hydrocarbons are 
presented in figure 8. These data were taken from references 8 J 12 J 
and 13. The classes of compounds differ greatly in their ignition 
temperatures and even within the same class of compounds (for example, 
paraffins) branched structures (fig. 8(b» have higher ignition tem-
peratures than straight-chain structures. 
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Significance of combustible liquid characterietics in relation 
to aircraft fire problem. - In considering aircraft fires, either in 
crash or in flight, there are innumerable circumstances in which the 
properties of the combustible liquids present can play an important 
part. In order to illustrate the behavior of combustible liquids 
in aircraft fires, several situations have been assumed and an effort 
has been made to anticipate the role of the combustible liquid on the 
basis of known facts. 
(1) If the atmosphere adjacent to a conventional gasoline is not 
confined, the mixture in the viCinity of the gasoline is usually 
combustible. The distance away from the liquid surface over which 
the mixture is combustible depends upon the extent of the air dilu-
tion. This statement is supported by the fact that the flash point 
of gasoline is about -400 F. The temperature of the atmosphere at 
sea level, except on rare occasions, is therefore considerably above 
the flash point of the gasoline. Thus when gasoline may be spilled, 
as in an airplane crash or gasoline leakage from lines or tanks into 
open wing spaces, it is almost certain that combustible fuel-air 
mixtures will be present and will ignite if exposed to a suitable 
source of ignition. 
(2) If at sea level the atmosphere adjacent to a conventional 
gasoline is confined, as in a fuel tank, the fuel-air mixture over 
the liquid is not combustible if the fuel temperature in the tank 
is above approximately 150 F; at higher temperatures, the fuel-air 
mixture over the liquid fuel in the tank is too "rich" to burn. If, 
however, the tank is ruptured and this fuel-air mixture escapes to 
the atmosphere, the mixture is "leaned" to possible combustible 
mixtures and exposure to suitable sources of ignition will cause a 
fire. At temperatures between 15° and -500 F, combustible mixtures 
can and do exist in airplane tanks carrying conventional gasoline 
at altitudes below 10,000 feet; however, this range varies with 
altitudes. (See fig. 6.) The combustibility limits shown in this 
figure were obtained from reference 25 and the shaded area was 
determined by data from the California Research Corporation. 
(3) On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it Is apparent 
that a fuel of lower volatility than conventional gasoline is 
desirable if the hazard of combustible fuel-air mixtures is to be 
reduced when fuel is exposed to the atmosphere. In a confined 
space, however, the fuel-air mixture over liquid low-volatility 
fuel may be combustible up to an altitude of 10,000 feet, if fuel 
temperatures in excess of about 80° F are encountered. If fuel tem-
peratures above 800 F are encountered more frequently than tempera-
tures below 200 F, which is the upper limit of inflammability for 
Ol 
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conventional gasoline, low-volatility fuel will be a potentially 
greater hazard in tanks than conventional gasoline. Conversely, if 
fuel temperatures below 200 F are encountered more frequently than 
temperatures above 800 F, conventional gasoline will be a potentially 
greater hazard than low-volatility fuel. In either case, it is 
significant that gasoline-air mixtures in a tank are not always non-
combustible and low-volat1lity fuel-air mixtures are not always 
combustible. In other words, the fuel-air mixture within a tank is 
alternately combustible and noncombustible, depending upon the con-
ditions. Frcm this standpoint, the use of an inerting medium in a 
fuel tank is justifiable whether the fuel is gasoline or low-
volat1lity fuel. 
(4) In the case of spillage of large quantities of fuel that 
may be exposed to ignition sources, as in the case ot an airplane 
crash, the rate of flame propagation for the fuel is of prime 
importance in regard to the rapidity of flame spread around or over 
the wreckage. If the surface temperature of a fuel, whether con-
ventional gasoline or low-volatility fuel, is below the flash point, 
no flame will travel over the surface. Inasmuch as conventional 
gasoline spilled in crash would seldom be at a tsmperature below 
ita flash point (-400 F), rapid flame spread can be expected. 
With a low-volatility fuel, the surface temperature of the fuel 
exposed during crash will be considerably below the flash point (1050 F) 
unless the crash occurs on hot days before the fuel has had sufficient 
time to cool below its flash point. Fuel in the tanks of parked air-
craft may reach temperatures considerably above ambient temperatures 
on hot days, and thus a low-volatility fuel with a flash point of. 1050 F 
could easily be at a temperature above its flash point. Data presented 
in figure 9 show the variation of fuel temperature during an 82-minute 
fl1ght. The maximum drop in fuel temperature recorded was about 320 F 
and was reached 50 minutes after take-off. D.lrlng descent the fuel 
temperature began to rise and at landing was about 200 F lower than 
at take-off. It is therefore apparent that if the temperature of 
the low-volatility fuel at take-off had been about 1400 F, the entire 
flight could have been made with combustible vapors in the tank. 
These data are cited to show that under certain conditions low-
volatility fuel may exceed its flash point at the t1m~ of crash; as 
previously stated, however, conventional gasoline is nearly always 
above its flash point. 
Data on the rate of flame propagation over the surface of com-
bustible liquids have been obtained by the Shell Development Company. 
Part of these data resulted from tests in which 20 gallons of each 
------~ 
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test fuel were burned in a rectangular concrete trough 30 feet long 
and 4 feet wide with a fuel depth of about 1/4 inch. In the 
following table the burning rates for three fuels of different 
volatility are compared: 
Vapor Burning 
Fuel pressure rate 
(mmHg) (ft/min) 
Gasoline 240 800 
Low-volatility 
fuel 6 35 
Dieselene < 0.5 12 
These burning rates were measured when the fuels were burning 
at a wind velocity of about 400 feet per minute (4.5 mph). In tests 
comparing the influence of burning rates with and against the wind 
in the same 30-foot trough, the following results were obtained: 
Fuel 
Gasoline 
Low-volatility 
fuel 
Burning rate 
Crt/min) 
With wind Against wind 
800 400 
30 15 
The temperature of the fuel used in these tests was varied 
from 660 to 900 F. The data indicated that the flame-spread rate 
is solely a function of fuel vapor pressure. More extensive tests 
made by the Shell Development Company on a 4-foot tray and with 
three fuels confirmed this relation. (See fig. 10.) I8ta fram 
tests with the small tray did not confirm the large-scale tests, in 
which burning against the wind halved the burning rate. (See fl~. 11.) 
A reduction in wind velocity fram 800 to 400 feet per minute (fig. 11) 
decreased the flame velocity from 41 to 15 feet per minute, a decrease 
of 64 percent < 
In the study of the effects of wind velocity, the Shell Develop-
ment Company found that the difficulty of ignition, particularly 
with low-volatility fuels, increases with wind velOCity. 
- - - --------~ - - ----
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(5) Stagnant combustible mixtures of air and gasoline or oil 
vapors will ignite if permitted to remain in contact with surfaces 
having temperatures above about 4550 F (reference 20). This limit 
Is not definitely established, however, OWing to the number of 
factors that influence measurements of spontaneous-ignition temper-
atures. 
The general tendency for same parallelism between spontaneous-
ignition temperatures and knock ratings of fuels is more relative 
than absolute. Regardless of this fact, the trends of such data 
indicate that the higher the knock rating, the higher the spontaneous-
ignition temperature. This in itself is a fortunate circumstance 
inasmuch as high-knock-rating fuel components are needed in order 
to produce commercial blends in the desired performance grade (100/130). 
Thus, whether the 100/130 fuel produced is in the gasoline range or 
the low-volatility fuel range, its spontaneous-ignition temperature 
would be relatively high. This is substantiated by the following 
data fram the California Research Corporation: 
Perform- Spontaneous-
Fuel snce ignition grade temperature 
(~) 
AN-F-28 100/130 1030 
Paraffinic 
low-volatility fuel 99/123 1040 
Aromatic 
low-volatility 97/>170 1120 
120 grade aviation oil -------- 830 
It is interesting to compare these ignition temperatures, which 
were obtained with laboratory apparatus, with the follow1ng average 
ign1tion temperatures obtained by splashing fuel on a hot pipe as 
reported by the Texas Company: 
Fuel 
AN-F-28 
Low-volatility fuel 
(3000_4000 F) 
Average 
spontaneous-
ignition 
temperature 
(wi thin ±1000 F 
1250 
120 grade aviation oil 
1250 
1000 
J 
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In an investigation reported by the Civil AeronautiCs Adminis-
tration (reference 26) it was found that under operating conditions 
the highest exhaust-stack temperature encountered for the particular 
engine studied was 11500 F. At this temperature it can be assumed 
that gasoline, low-volatility fuel, and lubricating oil would ignite 
on the stack. Thus, insofar as fuel and exhaust-stack temperature 
are concerned, low-volatility fuel offers no advantage over conven-
tional gasoline. On the other hand, when the air around the exhaust 
stack is in motion, as in flight, the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion data shown in figure 12 for four inflammable liquids indicate 
that the difficulty of ignition increases as the air flow around the 
exhaust stack is increased. This fact is consistent with the Shell 
Development Company data mentioned earlier, in which the difficulty 
of ignition, particularly with low-volatility fuels, increased with 
wind velOCity. This fact is based on the 30-foot and 4-foot tray 
tests in which the fuel was ignited by means of a lighted taper or 
torch. 
In addition to these data, the Texas Company has made tests of 
ignition tendencies of fuels when subjected to different surface 
coOOi tions. These tests were made by crashing fuel on a concrete 
platfor.m at selected distances from an ignition source. Ignition 
tendency was expressed as the temperature differential (A.S.T.M. 
10-percent evaporated temperature of the fuel - ambient-air temper-
ature) necessary for ignition to occur. The results, referred to 
dry-platform conditions, are as follows: 
Change in igni ti on 
Condition of platform temperature differential 
(within ±l000 F) 
Wet 
Filled with water 
Raining 
Filled with snow 
Filled with sand 
No effect 
No effect 
Decreases by 150 
Increases by 500 
Increases by 150 
The fuels used were blends of aviation gasoline and a commercial 
solvent. 
In oonnection with spontaneous ignition of fuels and oils, 
the Civil Aeronautics Administration (reference 26) found that 
after a fire occurred the heat from the fire had raised the tem-
perature of the exhaust stack to 14000 F. Below this temperature, 
laboratory tests showed that SAE No. 10 oil would not ignite on a 
steel plate but that oil vapor would ignite at temperatures as low 
as 7500 F. 
---~--- -- ----""""-- -~-----~-
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Hydraulic Fluids 
The use of hydraulic-control systems in aircraft presents 
another serious problem in regard to fire hazard, in that additional 
hydrocarbon oils are present under high pressure and may possibly be 
exposed to ignition sources. This problem has been erlensi vely 
investigated at the Naval Research Laboratory (references 27 and 28) 
since 1941. The research on this problem has been directed toward 
the achievement of less-inflammable and noninflammable hydraulic 
fluids and much of the information obtained is directly applicable 
to the search for less hazardous lubricating oils. In partIcular, 
flammability characteristics have been reported (reference 27) for 
organic phosphates, carbonates, silicone fluids, Ucon fluids 
(Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation), glycols, and aqueous 
glycol solutions. Additional data were obtained on the effects of 
chlorination on inflammability. 
The results of this work (references 27 and 28) indicate that 
the following fluid types are unsuitable as noninflammable hydraulic 
fluids: 
(a) Petroleum fractions with or without oxidation inhibitors 
(b) Petroleum fractions containing various volatile organic 
flame-resistant additives to serve as fire chokers or quenchers 
(c) Phosphoric-acid esters such as trioctyl phosphate, tributyl 
phosphate, and tricresyl phosphate 
(d) Mixtures of organiC solvents such as alcohols, ethers, and 
alcohol-ethers thickened to the desired viscosity with blown castor 
011 
(e) Esters of dibasic aCids, especially those having erlremely 
low volatilities 
The following less flammable fluid types showed promise as 
hydraulic fluids: 
(a) The chlorinated or fluorinated hydrocarbons and ethers 
containing approximately three atoms of halogen per molecule (for 
the substances studied, this was equivalent to nearly 50-percent 
halogenation of the compound) 
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(b) The silicones with viacosities of over 20 centistokes at 
1000 F, if properly stripped of volatile fractions or impurities. 
The substances particularly of interest here are the polymethyl-
siloxanes and the copolymers, the poly- (methyl, phenyl) s11oxanes. 
(c) Certain polyalkylene oxides 
(d) The glycols containing high percentages of oxygen 
(e) Certain aqueous organic solutions containing sufficiently 
high proportions of water to render them noninflammable. 
Consideration (reference 28) of such factors as effects on 
packings, volatility, flash point, desired viscosity index, and 
availability led to the conclusion that an ethylene-glycol-water 
mixture providee the moet promising possibility for obtaining 
a less inflammable hydraulic fluid in the near f~ture and service 
tests are now in progress. It 1s indicated, however, that the 
other promising noninflammable hydraulic fluids examined in this 
study (reference 28) may, after extensive development, be 
applicable to aircraft. 
In addition to the foregoing investigation, the Civil 
Aeronautics Adminiatration has conducted a study of the 
inflammability characteristics of certain hydraulic fluids (ref-
erence 29). The fluids examined were released at pressures of 
1000 and 3000 pounds per square inch and exposed to ignition by 
exhaust flames, hot exhaust stack, ignition spark, and burning 
gasoline. Also, crash tests were simulated by ejecting the fluids 
at 3000 pounds per square inch through an electr1c arc and oxy-
acetylene flame. 
Seven fluids . were tested (reference 29) in comparison with 
standard aircraft hydrauliC fluid and all seven showed less tendency 
to ignite than did the standard fluid. However, with the exception 
of a fluid consisting of ethylene glycol, water, and additive~ these 
fluids would ignite under some of these conditions. The ethylene -
glycol-water mixture is inflammable after expulsion of the water. 
Extinguishing 
The degree of freedom from fire likely to be achieved in air-
craft will not preclude the use of fire extinguishing equipment. 
Research and development have been sponsored by the U. S. Air 
Forces, Bureau of AeronautiCS, Bureau of Mines, and the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration, at government laboratories and private 
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laboratories, whereby the practices of fire extinguishi~ may be 
advanced. In addition, investigations reported by the British (ref-
erence 4) have contained many recommendations regarding the 
extinguishing of aircraft fires. 
The extinguishing investigations conducted by the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration (references 26, 30, and 31) are primarily 
concerned with the effectiveness of various extinguishing agents 
and the quantities required, rates of application, and optimum 
methods of distribution when applied to gasoline and oil fires 
occurring in flight. The conclusions drawn in reference 26 are 
indicative of the scope of the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
studies and are of considerable interest in relation to the problem 
of extinguishing fires in flight. These conclusions are as follows: 
1. Extinguishment of most aircraft-power-plant gasoline and oil 
fires occurring in flight can be accomplished within reasonable 
weight limitations, provided that adequate rates of extinguishing-
agent application and optimum distribution methods are used and 
provided further that gasoline flow is shut off before extinguish-
ment is attempted. 
2. Extinguishment of 011 fires occurring in flight can be 
accomplished without stopping the oil flow but oil shut-off is 
advisable to prevent recurrence of the fire. 
3. Air blast is the most serious factor to overcome in the 
extinguishment of aircraft-power-plant fires, and is overcame by 
using adequate rates of agent application. 
4. Gasoline fires are more difficult to extinguish in the 
accessory section than oil fires. 
5. The safety-fuel fires in the tests were as difficult to 
extinguish as fires burning 87-octane aviation gasoline. 
6. Within limits, large fires are no more difficult to 
extinguish than small fires. 
7. The power section, the accessory section, the oil cooler, 
and the exhaust-stack well must be individually protected against 
fire. 
8. The extinguishing agent in the power and accessory sections, 
and all other locations, should be simultaneously discharged. 
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9. Teata indicated that wheel-well protec ion is unnecessary, 
provided the firewall is leakproof. 
10. The discharge of extinguishing agent frcm the power section 
is necessary to extinguish accessory-section fires. 
11. Teste indicated that methyl bromide and carbon dioxide are 
the only extinguishing agents of those tested that are satisfactory 
for general protection against fires in flight in the type of power-
plant installation tested. Methyl bromide was found to be the most 
satisfactory agent from the fire-extinguishing standpoint. 
12. The rate of extinguishing- agent application is the most 
important factor in the application of an extinguishing agent. For 
the entire engine installation, a rate of application of 9 pounds 
per second of methyl bromide or 10.8 pounds per second of carbon 
dioxide is required. 
13. The minimum duration of extinguishing- agent application 
should be approximately 2 seconds. 
14. Tests indicated that application of the extinguishing agent 
ahead of the engine cylinders is ineffective and unnecessary. 
In regard to conclusion 5, it was found (reference 26) that 
in an air blast, low-volatility-fuel fires were as difficult to 
extinguish as the gasoline fires. This result is contrary to 
results of tests conducted by the Texas Company on crashing fuels 
in a 10-mile-per-hour wind. 
The first of the following tables indicates the influence of 
water pressure at the nozzle on the time required to extinguish 
burning fuel. The other tables show the times required to 
extinguish 2-gallon samples of fuels of varying volatility. 
EXTINGUISHING 3000 -4000 F ALKYLATE WITH WATER 
[l~inCh Rockwood fog nozzle] 
Fog-nozzle pressure Extinguishing time 
(lb/sq in.) (sec) 
50 27 
100 14 
125 16 
- ~-- --- -- - -- - - -- - -----~ 
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EXTINGUISHING VARIOUS FUELS WITH WATER 
[l~inch Rockwood fog nozzle] 
Fuel 
Extinguish-
ing time 
(sec) 
100/130 grade aviation gasoline a42 
2000 -3000 F fuel 34 
2500 -3500 F fuel 25 
3000 -4000 F fuel b14 
aCheck run, 36 seconds. 
bCheck run, 18 seconds. 
EXTINGUISHING VARIOUS FUELS WITH Dll'lf'E.Rl!m AGENTS 
Extinguish- Extinguish-
Fuel iug time ing agent 
100/130 grade 
aviation gasoline 
3000 -4000 F fuel 
100/130 grade 
aviation gasoline 
3000 -4000 F fuel 
(sec) 
50 
28 
37 
6 
Stable foam 
Stable foam 
Carbon dioxide 
Carbon dioxide 
19 
It will be observed in the foregoing data that in every case, fires 
fram fuels of lower volatility were extinguished more quickly than 
fire from gasoline. 
In reference 32 the Civil Aeronautics Administration has 
summarized the findings presented in references 26, 30, and 31 in 
an effort to present concisely the details of fire extinguishing 
needed for application by aircraft design engineers. This summary 
itemizes the potential zones of fire determined from 3000 fire tests 
on two radial engines, one of which was a l4-cyllnder double-row 
type and the other a seven-cylinder single-row type. Alao itemized 
are the modes of protection recommended for each of these zones 
and equations are given for computation of quantities of methyl 
bromide or carbon dioxide required for certain zones. Similar 
recommendations are given for design and location of fire-detecting 
devices. 
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Although the literature on extinguishing is quite extensive, 
the achievements in the field appear to be predominately the result 
of applied investigation rather than fundamental. The action of 
most fire-extinguishing agents has been explained as the cooling 
of a combustible mixture below the ignition temperature or the 
blanketing of the fuel with an inert material so as to exclude 
oxygen from the area involved. In addition to these actions, one 
investigation (reference 33) has indicated that aqueous solutions 
of certain salts in small concentrations will extinguish fires. 
These investigators stated that the fire extinguishing action was 
not one of cooling or oxygen dilution, but could be explained only 
on the basis of a salt influencing the combustion process. Other 
investigators have also reported that the extinguishing action of 
certain materials is greater than can be accounted for by dilution 
of oxygen, and that the extinguishing effect differs with different 
chemicals. Cameron (reference 34) states that combustibles will 
not burn in an atmosphere containing 6 to 15 percent carbon dioxide, 
depending upon the combustible, whereas only 3 to 6 percent of 
methyl bromide is required for extinguishing. Ia another case 
(reference 35) 15 percent by weight of methyl bromide was required 
to extinguish a standard gasoline wind-tunnel fire) which required 
45 percent of carbon dioxide for extinguishing. 
In still another case, the Bureau of Mines (reference 36) 
reported that 26 percent by volume of carbon dioxide will inert 
an isobutane-air mixture, wher.eas 40 percent of nitrogen is 
required. These cases indicate that various materials influence 
the combustion process in addition to the blanketing action that 
they exert. 
Regardless of the nature of the available data on extinguishing, 
that is, whether such data were obtained by applied or fundamental 
investigation, the known facts on the subject are extensive and of 
inestimable value to aircraft designers. Additional studies of the 
fundamental effects of extinguishing agents on basic combustion 
reactions will be required before the basic mechanisms of extin-
guishing are completely understood. 
Detection 
Concomitant with extinguishing is detection of fire or com-
bustible mixture. The need for reliable and immediate fire detec-
tion has been universally recognized. Means have been proposed for 
(]) 
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the detection of a predetermined high compartment-temperature level, 
high rate of rise of compartment temperature, flame, smoke, and com-
bustible vapor. 
Predetermined temperature levels may be detected by the use of 
electric switches actuated by fusible-metal-alloy links or other 
devices, bimetal actuated electric switches, thermoelectric-effect 
and relay switches, low-melting-temperature insulating material that 
allows an electric circuit to close when heated above a predetermined 
temperature level, explosive-charge actuated devices, and liquid-
filled capsule or tube actuating devices. High compartment tempera-
ture rate of rise may be detected by the use of bimetal switches or 
thermocouple circuits. Flame may be detected by the use of photo-
electric cells that are insensitive to daylight or heat, electron-
ically coupled with necessary indicating devices; electrical con-
duction through an ionized gas; and fuses of combustible material. 
Smoke may be detected by the use of photoelectric devices in which 
light is attenuated by the presence of smoke in a compartment. Ccm-
bustible vapors may be detected by the use of devices that catalyt-
ically cause the combustion of a very small part of the vapor and 
produce a small temperature rise. 
The development of detection devices haa been sponsored by the 
U. S. Air Forces, the Bureau of Aeronautics, and the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration in numerous private manufacturing concerns. 
The Air Materiel Command of the U. S. Air Forces currently reports 
that no completely satisfactory system or device has yet been 
developed. 
The indication of a high temperature level by the use of bimetal 
actuated electric switches appears to be the most reliable and there-
fore the most practical means at the present time. In reaching this 
conclusion, infallibility has been the principal criterion of merit 
of the various devices. Rate-of-temperature-rise detectors are 
inclined to 8i ve falsR warnings for some normal engine operating 
conditions. Thermoelectric devices are delicate and complicated. 
It is recognized that the use of continuous strip sensing elements 
are desirable because by Buch means the greatest part of a compart-
ment can be guarded. If individual point sensing elements are employed, 
a large number must be used. 
An important advantage of the high temperature level detector 
is that this device also may indicate some types of engine mal-
functioning, which, if permitted to continue, would result in a fire 
or other serious calamity. 
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Existing smoke detectors have been found only partly satis-
factory because they give a warning when water clouds or carbon 
dioxide clouds are present in sufficient concentration to attenuate 
the light to the photoelectric cell. Such has been the case in 
baggage compartments in which dry ice has been used as a cargo 
cooling agent. 
Combustible-vapor detectors have been found unsatisfactory 
because of the fragile and unreliable nature of existing devices. 
The continuance of the vigorous development effort now in 
progress can be expected to result in ilnprovement in the detection 
of fire or excessive temperatures in vulnerable compartments in the 
airplane. A study of" the fire problem indicates that as the potency 
of the existing combustibles is reduced, as ignition sources are 
eliminated, and when compartmentation and configuration are more 
conducive to greater fire safety, the problem of detection will be 
significantly reduced. 
Summary Statement Regarding Combustible 
Liquids and Aircraft Fire Problem 
At first glance many of the points discussed in the foregoing 
sections appear to be contradictory. Actually these contradictions 
may be attributed to the conditions used by the various investiga-
tors. In most cases, however, these differences in conditions have 
no serious effect on the conclusions that may be drawn, but the 
appli cation of a particular conclusion to the aircraft fire problem 
must be considered from two possible viewpoints: fire in flight 
and fire after crash. The following conclusions indicated by the 
data are so given: 
Fire in flight. -
1. Combustible mixtures will probably exist more frequently 
in aircraft tanks containing low-volatility fuel than in tanks 
containing conventional gasoline. It is emphasized, however, that 
even with gasoline the fuel-air mixture in a tank is not always 
noncombustible. 
2. In stagnant-air spaces (unconfined) in which fuel may be 
present and exposed to ignition sources, low-volatility fuel is 
more difficult to ignite and will propagate flame less rapidly than 
gasoline. 
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3. In an air blast, fires resulting from low-volatility fuels 
are as difficult to extinguish as fires from gasoline. 
4. In stagnant-air spaces, fires resulting from low-volatility 
fuels are easier to extinguish than fires from gasoline. 
Fire after crash. -
1. When conventional gasoline is spilled, as in the case of an 
airplane crash or of gasoline leakage from lines into unconfined 
areas of an airplane structure, it is almost certain that combustible 
fuel-air mixtures will be present and will ignite if exposed to a 
suitable source of ignition. 
2. Low-volatility fuel will not ignite as readily as gasoline, 
if spilled during crash and exposed to a suitable ignition source, 
unless conditions are such that all or part of the low-volatility 
fuel is above the flash-point temperature (about 1050 F). 
3. At sea-level conditions and wind velocities less than 5 miles 
per hour, low-volatility fuel fires spread at a considerably lower 
rate than gasoline, with or against the wind. 
4. If splashed on hot surfaces, oil will ignite at surface tem-
peratures lower than those for low-volatility fuel and gasoline. 
Low-volatility fuel and gasoline are about equal in this respect. 
5. Limited tests indicate that gasoline and a gasoline-solvent 
blend splashed in the open have an increased tendency to ignite in 
rain. The ignition tendency is decreased if fuel is splashed on 
snow or sand. No effect was noticed on water or a wet surface. 
6. In still air, a low-volatility fuel fire is more easily 
extinguished than a gasoline fire. 
The data also indicate t: '.at a less inflammable or noninflammable 
lubricating oil 1s desirable and the attainment of such an oil is 
possible in light of recent developments in hydraulic fluids 
discussed in the succeeding section. 
The adaptation of less-inflammable or noninflammable liquids 
to use in aircraft will probably require considerable development 
work; however, no insurmountable obstacles are foreseen. Con-
siderable data on the merits of low-volatility fuels in regard to 
antiknock behavior have been published. Data on the possibilities 
of fuel-injection systems also exist and such systems have been 
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operated successfully. Moreover, the use of fuel injection eliminates 
the carburetor system now utilized in aircraft and thereby eliminates 
another potential ~ire hazard. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF POSSIBLE IGNITION SOURCES 
Insofar as fire hazards are concerned, ignition sources are of 
equal importance with the characteristics o~ combustible liquids. 
Most ignition sources can be classified in general as hot surfaces, 
electric sparks and arcs, ~lame, or hot gases. A few miscellaneous 
sources do not fit rigorously into one o~ these four groups, and 
certain aircraft components or systems such as the exhaust system 
may provide ignition sources in two or three of these groups. Some 
of the sources are always present; others require rupturing o~ a 
Wire, malfunctioning o~ eqUipment, or other accidental event to 
become active. The following survey of ignition sources is incomplete, 
but serves as a basis for determining where attention might be directed 
in any attempt to substantially reduce fire hazards. 
Hot Surfaces 
A large number of probable hot-surface ignition sources exist 
on the typical present-day aircraft; exhaust ducts, combustion heaters, 
short-circuited wiring, and friction-heated parts are typical examples. 
In considering when a hot sur~ace is an ignition source, it is noted 
from the preceding section that surfaces having temperatures as low 
as about 4550 F have ignited stagnant combustible mixtures of air 
and gasoline or oil vapors, but spontaneous-ignition temperatures are 
markedly affected by such local ~actors as the nature and condition 
of the hot surface, the composition of the combustible mixture, and 
the time of content. 
Because an almost infinite number of combinations of local factors 
can be encountered in the design of an aircraft or in the event of a 
crash, a consideration of hot surfaces as ignition sources should be 
based on the lowest ignition temperatures known for the combustibles 
carried in the aircraft. 
Exhaust system. - Four parts of the exhaust system may be con-
sidered as hot-surface ignition sources: the exhaust ducting, the 
exhaust valve, the piston head, and the cylinder head, both interior 
and exterior. 
The temperatures of the exhaust duct and the exhaust valve are 
well in excess of the minimum ignition temperatures of gasoline-air 
-.-----~ -
f 
NACA RM No. E8B18 25 
mixtures, as shown by the exhaust-duct temperatures or 6750 to 10200 F 
cited in rererence 37 or 11500 F cited in reference 26 and exhaust-
valve temperatures of 11400 to 13000 F in reference 38. Piston-head 
temperatures will normally run below minimum ignition temperatures, 
but may reach ignition temperatures when the engine is operated at 
take-orf or emergency power. Rererence 39 indicates that piston-head 
temperatures may normally operate between 3250 to 4650 F. It 1s 
improbable that the exterior surraces of cylinder heads would act as 
ignition sources because they normally operate below 4000 F, with 
maximum cylinder-head temperatures usually limited to 450 0 or 5000 F. 
The high temperature and the exposed location of the exhaust 
ducting marks it as one of the most likely ignition sources on the 
aircraft, and past experience shows that many aircrart fires have been 
started by the exhaust ducting. Numerous examples of fires caused by 
the presence or the failure of the exhaust ducting are known and in 
reference 26 it was concluded after a long series of tests that lithe 
most dangerous source of oil ignition in an aircraft power-plant 
installation is an exhaust system employing shrouds, mufrs, and barrles 
ror collecting heated carburetor air." Such barrles enclose a rel-
atively stagnant body of air and result in ignition when well venti-
lated surfaces do not. 
The role of the exhaust valve and combustion chamber as an igni-
tion source is not so obvious, except that exhaust valves are suffi-
. ciently hot to be classified as potential ignition sources. An engine 
that is forcibly stopped, as in a crash, may have been functioning 
normally up to the instant it is stopped. Such an engine will have 
at least one cylinder freshly charged with fuel and the intake valve 
still open. With both the entire combustion chamber and the exhaust 
valve at high temperature, the fresh charge is almost sure to ignite 
and the flame could spread back through the entire induction system. 
This flame may then set fire to fuel released by the crash. A French 
writer (reference 40) points out that sudden changes in speed, such 
as might take place when a propeller strikes the ground in a crash, 
are accompanied by backfires that are a fire hazard. The occurrence 
of such backfires may be explained by the aforementioned process. 
Combustion heaters. - Gasoline combustion heaters provide heated 
surfaces very similar to exhaust ducts. The walls of combustion 
heaters are generally of a fairly light gage metal, easily broken in 
an accident. A heater may be adequately lagged for normal operation, 
but destruction of the outside lagging or of the unit itself in an 
accident may expose surfaces hot enough to act as ignition sources. 
It should also be pointed out that, in present aircraft, gasoline is 
--- -- ------
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piped throughout the aircraft to supply the combustion heaters. The 
status of the combustion heater as concerned with fire, however, has 
not been completely studied. 
Electrical equipment. - Electrical equipment such as motors and 
generators, short-circuited wires, or loose connections may also 
provide hot-surface ignition sources. 
Modern aircraft make use of many electric motors for operating 
auxiliary equipment of which fuel pumps, cowl-flap actuators, air 
damp~rs, blowers, landing-gear retracting mechanisms and starting 
motors are representative examples. Not all of these motors are 
explosion proof, nor is there any requirement that these motors not 
act as either arc or hot-surface ignition sources. Data in refer-
ence 41, when extrapolated, show that if the rotor of a small air-
craft motor is locked it can reach temperatures as high as 4500 F in 
less than a minute with an impressed potential of 29.5 volts. 
The general rules for operating engine starting motors specify 
alternate operating and cooling cycles of l-minute duration. 
Literature surveyed to date does not show whether such operation 
will keep the maximum temperature below the spontaneous-ignition 
temperature of fuel or oil, and the starting-motor specifications 
reviewed do not definitely state that they are explosion proof. 
Large aircraft generators are normally cooled by blast tubes, 
which take ram air from well forward in the cowling. Reference 42 
shows that at about 110 percent of rating the hot-spot temperature 
of a generator was 4460 F and points out that commutators must be 
designed to withstand temperatures up to 482 0 F (2500 C). Commercial 
generators are usually protected from extreme overloads by current-
limiting regulators and should therefore not overheat. Thus a 
generator would not normally be an ignition source in flight; however, 
during crash conditions, if the generator has been under heavy load 
or has been malfunctioning and the engine is suddenly stopped, the 
generator could conceivably act as a hot-surface ignition source. 
The Bureau of Mines has shown that a light bulb filament greater 
than 0.0068 inch in diameter heated to over 30000 F will conSistently 
ignite natural gas-air mixtures (reference 43). In another series 
of tests (reference 21), nickel wires 0.040 inch in diameter ignited 
methane-air mixtures at temperatures as low as 14700 F, which is 
belot-T the m.elting point of copper. Because gasoline-air mixtures 
have lower ignition temperatures than natural gas or methane-air 
mixtures, there is the possibility that a bare short-circuited wire 
will ignite a combustible mixture. The influence of fire-resistant 
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or charred insulation on the tendency of the wire to act as an ignitor 
is not definitely known. 
Normally, the electrical system can be protected by circuit 
breakers or fuses. In a crash, however, it is possible that such 
equipment may no longer protect the system. These protective units 
may also be deliberately or accidentally bypassed by operating 
personnel. The wiring system in many airpl~es also includes an 
unprotected conductor between the battery and the breaker box and 
another such conductor between the pilot compartment and the contactor 
that disconnects the battery from the breaker box. 
Friction-heated surfaces and hot particles. - Hot surfaces and 
hot particles (sparks) may be produced by friction and mechanical 
interference in a malfunctioning engine or by an airplAne sliding 
along the ground. Surfaces heated by friction will have essentially 
the same general ignition characteristics as surfaces heated by 
other means and need no further discussion. When both the aircraft 
structure and the ground are conSidered, many materials may strike 
and produce a spar..k. 
It is apparent from the work of different investigators that 
hot particles mayor may not be ignition sources, depending upon 
their temperature and size and the relative velocity between the 
combustible mixture and the particles. The British reported in ref-
erence 19 that they were unable to ignite a gasoline-air mixture 
with steel-to-steel sparks produced by a rotating, 2-inch-diameter, 
serrated, hardened steel wheel in contact with a hardened, chigel-
pointed rod. Reating a rod to a dull red heat and grinding sparks 
from it 'fUh the same serrated wheel l1kew1se failed to ignite the 
mixture, nor did steel-emery-wheel sparks provide ignition. These 
tests were cons idered inconclus i ve, however, because it 'fas not 
definitely established that the most easily ignited mixture had 
been used. T~ite and Price (reference 44) state that steel-to-
steel, emery-to-steel, and pyrites-to-steel sparks would not ignite 
combustlble ether-alcohol-air and acetone-air mixtures, but that 
ferro-cerium to steel sparks readily ignited most mixtures. It is 
possible, however, that the sparks studied in these two series of 
tests were not large enough or of high enough temperature to serve 
as ignition sources. 
Silver, Patterson, and others have studied the ignition of 
inflammable gases by hot moving particles of larger size. Silver 
(reference 22), in a study using both platinum and quartz spheres 
of diameters from 0.043 to 0.216 inch, and combustible pentane, 
hydrogen, and coal gas mixtures, found that in every case the 
- - - - --~-~.~-. 
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minimum ignition temperature varied greatly with the size of the 
sphere, diminishing with increase in sphere diameter, although less 
rapidly as ~he size increased. Ignition temperatures ranged from 
2000 to 650 F above the ignition temperature of the mixture as 
determined by other means. In another serles of tests (reference 23), 
Patterson found there was a minimum ignition temperature for a given 
size of sphere below which no ignition was obtained. This temperature 
appeared independent of the richness of the mixture, of the "age" of 
the sphere, and of its material, so far as this was varied (quartz 
and platlnum). The ignition temperature was well above those 
indicated by the more usual sources of ignition. It was also found 
that the ignition temperature increased with increased relative 
velocity between the mixture and the sphere and that this relation 
was roughly linear. 
No data have been found that give the relations among particle 
size, particle temperature, relative velocity, and fuel-air ratio 
for the various aircraft materials and combustibles, nor are the 
particle sizes involved in engine destruction and accident abrasion 
known. It is therefore impossible at this time to evaluate completely 
the importance of hot particles as ignition sources for aircraft fires. 
In the British spark tests, the hot particles were not of the size or 
the temperature to cause ignition. Other studies have shown, however, 
that hot sparks under appropriate conditions will be ignition sources. 
The rupture of metallic parts 1s known to produce heat and also 
static electricity (reference 45). The British Air Ministry ran 
tests, in which piano steel wires 0.015 and 0.030 inch in diameter 
suddenly broke in a mixture of gasoline and air, to determine whether 
such rupture would cause ignition. No ignition was obtained. They 
also point out that "a rise in temperature takes place during the 
elongation before fracture of a tensile test piece depending on the 
material and the speed of application of the load, but in an extreme 
case seldam exceeds 1000 C." It is therefore considered that simple 
rupture of structural or mechanical members is not an important 
ignition source. 
Electric Sparks and Arcs 
The three general primary sources of electrical energy in an 
aircraft are engine-driven and auxlliary-power-plant driven generators, 
the ignition system, and static electricity generated in several ways. 
Several secondary sources also exist, which contain stored energy 
that can reappear as electrical energy, n&~ely: the battery, the 
radio, radar, wiring and electrical components that contain inductive 
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energy, and moving parts such as motor armatures, which contain 
kinetic energy. These sources may be important ignition hazards 
during accidents. 
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The quantity of energy required to ignite a combustible mixture 
by electric spark at atmospheric pressure is small. 
Guest (reference 46), in considering explosions in hospital 
operating rooms, munitions works, rubber and plastics manufacturing 
plants, and many industries where flammable vapors and dusts are 
present, observed from the work of other invest1gators that for 
certain gas mixtures an energy of 0.002 joule is required in a spark 
to cause ignition. Reference 47 shows that magnesium power requires 
an O.ll-joule spark if ignition is to be certain, although ignition 
is frequent with sparks of much lower energy content and ignition 
was occasionally obtained with sparks of about 0.03 joule. 
Lewis and von Elbe (reference 48) have shown that 0.0005 joule 
is the minimum spark energy required to ignite a stoichiometric 
mixture of natural gas and air at 1 atmosphere with electrode 
spacings of at least 0.1 inch. 
The present 28-~olt aircraft system is capable of producing 
sparks or arcs containing energy far in excess of the minimum 
required to ignite gasoline-air mixtures. Arcing occurs across the 
brushes of rotating electric-current equipment, both motors and 
generators, and could ignite a combustible mixture if it reached 
the arc. 
The present radio shielding of the engine ignition system 
precludes much possibility of its acting as an ignition source 
during normal operation or after the engines have stopped. 
Tne dangers of static-electricity discharge during ground 
operations are well known and have been discussed in the literature 
(for example, reference 49), but the dangers of such discharges 
during flight or an accident are not frequently considered. 
References 50 and 51, which are reports on radio-interference 
research conducted by the Army and Navy, state that an aircraft can 
be charged by contact with airborne particles such as snow, ice 
crystals, hail, rain, clouds, smoke, and dust. Individual parts of 
the airplane may also become charged with respect to one another by 
induction as the aircraft flies near clouds (reference 51). Addi-
tional ways in which the aircraft in part or as a whole may become 
charged are described in reference 45. Tne rate of rise of potential 
, 
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may be in the order of 200,000 volts or more per second when the air-
craft first encounters precipitation static (reference 52) and 
potentials of 500,000 volts have been recorded. It has also been shown 
shown that the capacitance of a plane is approximately 20 percent of 
its wing span in centimeters (reference 50). A simple calculation 
then indicates that the static charge on a representative commercial 
aircraft could supply thousands of times the minimum energy required 
for ignition; however, the hazard exists only when spark discharge 
occurs. This discharge can take place when the plane touches the 
ground or when a sudden shift of induced potential from one part of 
the aircraft to another occurs, as might happen when lightning dis-
charges a cloud adjacent to the aircraft. 
The Bureau of Mines has measured the electrical capacity of a 
human being (reference 47), and, assuming that the person were charged 
to only 10,000 volts, have calculated an electrical energy content 
of at least 0.015 joule, which could be given up in a spark discharge. 
Inasmuch as this quantity of energy is several times that required 
for ignition, passengers insulated from the structure by fabric matting 
and upholstering may also be considered as potential ignition sources. 
Static electricity is generated by the flow of fluids from 
tubes and can reach dangerous electrical potentials, as pointed out 
in reference 45. Potentials of 3000 or 4000 volts are easily obtained 
when petroleum products flow in tubes. This phenomenon can be a fire 
hazard when fuel tanks are being filled, if the aircraft is not 
grounded, or when fuel is being dumped in flight. 
The chemical energy stored in the battery, the inductive energy 
stored in the electric circuits of radio and radar, the inductive 
energy stored in representative electric circuits under load, and 
the inductive plus kinetic energy stored in equipment like electric 
motors can easily provide a spark of intensity greater than the 
minimum required for ignition. Recognizing this potential hazard 
in the event of a crash, the British have devised a switch that 
removes the battery from the circuits upon impact (reference 4). 
The ignition potential of airborne radio and radar equipment has 
been studied by the Underwriters Laboratory for the Air Forces and 
1s abstracted in reference 53. 
Although reference 4 states that in recent years electrical 
fires have been rare, the National Fire Protective Association (ref-
erence 3) cites that out of five fires in flight on commercial air 
carriers reported between July and November 1946, one was caused by 
electrical trouble and one by lightning (uncertain). 
-.--"'----~----- - ----- --~ - - ----
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Flame and Hot Gases 
Flames are without question ignition sources. Experimental 
evidence indicates that hot gas at the exhaust-stack outlet will 
ignite gasoline fumes; therefore, exhaust gas at normal operating 
temperatures (from 13000 to 17000 F) (references 37, 54, and 55) 
must be considered an ignition source. 
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Eng~le exhaust systems and combustion-type heaters are the most 
obvious sources of flame and hot gases, but backfires caused by 
excessively leaning out the fuel mixture, abrupt power changes, and 
the malfunctioning of the valve system must also be considered. 
Induction and exhaust systems are considered by the British of suf-
ficient importance that in ·combating nacelle fires they inject part 
of the fire-extinguishing medium into the induction system to help 
stop the engine and to inert residual unburned fuel (reference 4). 
Miscellaneous Ignition Sources 
Several possible ignition sources cannot be classified in any 
of the foregoing categories; for example, compression of trapped 
gases, friction heating of deflated tires, impact firing of fuel 
tanks, and oxygen-system explosions. Undoubtedly others exist . 
A recently concluded study of vacuum-system fires by the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration (reference 56) describes fires started 
in the vacuum-pressure pump systems by the compression and repeated 
working of trapped air. Inadvertently dropped Jettisonable fuel 
tanks have ignited upon impact. 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the review in the preceding sections of this report 
of the pertinent available data on the characteristics of the fuel, 
lubrican~and hydraulic fluid, and on ignition sources, considera-
tion may now be given to extensions of the data that are required 
to provide a more complete understanding of methods for substan-
tially reducing the fire hazard in airplanes. 
From the existing information on the ignition and combustion 
of aircraft fuels, it might be concluded that major reductions in 
the aircraft. fire hazard could be achieved by the use of a low-
volatili ty fuel. The data. Show, for example, that the flash point 
of l ow-volatility fue] ie considerably higher than gasoline and that 
the spread of flame across 8. fuel surface is only about one-twentieth 
l 
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as rapid for a low-volatility fuel as for gasoline. Because of these 
characteristics, the use of low-volatility fuel should reduce both 
the possibility of fire and tee tendency for the rapid and disasterous 
spread of fire that occurs following a crash or a major engine failure 
in flight. The likelihood of potential explosive mixtt;.res in aircraft 
ttl.nks when low-volatility fuels are carried could possibly be over-
come by inerting or purging with a gas like helium or nitrogen or 
with treated exhaust gas. Inerting appears to be a desirable feature, 
whether the fuel carried is a low-volatility type or a gasoline type, 
although further data are needed to evaluate inerting systems 
accurately. 
Although both small-scale and large-scale le.boratory tests are 
quite convincing in demonstrating the retarded ignition, slower rate 
of burning, and gener~lly less explosive char~cter of low-volatility 
fuel, a question remains as to whether or not a reduction in fire 
hazard wouLd actually result from the use in aircraft of low-
volatility fuel. It seems very doubtful if further bench or model 
tests of the sort that have been performed will answer this question 
any more completely than existing data. Consequently, crash tests 
to establish whether or not significant safety benefits are derived 
from low-volatility fuel appear to be required for final, convincing 
evidence. In these tests, multiengine, war-surplus transport air-
craft could be crashed, witt. engines rlUlning, from flight or from a 
ramp or cliff under circumstances closely simulating accident con-
ditions. Alternately, the aircra.ft would. contain ftrst conventiona l 
aviation gasoline and then the low-volatility fuel in jnerted tar~s. 
A sufficient number of airplanes could be cra.shed in order t o 
determine by visual observations and recorded data whether or not 
signiftcant differences in the frequency of fire and in the rate of 
spread of fire are experienced with the two types of fuel. The 
difficulty and expense of the crash tests is recognlzed, but no 
other technique appears to serve the same purpose. 
The practical ueefulnees of low-volatility fuel as a means of 
reducing the fire hazard depends not only upon whether ' 01" not it 
results in a significant reduction in the tendency of fire to start 
and to spread, but upon the service char~cteristics of engines that 
are operated on such fuels. Reduction in fire hazl3.rd by use of low-
volatility fuel must be accompanjed by englne reliabilit~ at least 
as good as that now achieved with conventional aviation easoline. 
Existing data of the petroleum and engine industries need to be 
extended to provide conclusive information on the serviceability of 
engines operating on low-volatility fuel. This info~ation may be 
obtained in test-stand investigations and in cargo airline operations. 
• 
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The lubricating oil may ignite first ~n !Dany fires And con-
stitute the source of lenition for the large bulks of fuel . A signi-
ficant reduction in the fire hazard lliay result from the use of non-
inflammable lubricants and the continued study of the aircraft fire 
problem may emphasize the advantages of the use of such a material. 
University and COillrrJercial laboratories, particularly in the petroleum 
jndustry, have started the development of some of the possible non-
inflarmnable lubricants . This phase of the research requires furt.her 
fundament.al investigation, which should include the synthesis of 
new compoUI.lds and experimental evaluation of the characteristics of 
lubricants in airplAne engines. 
Although the search for non:lnflammable hydraulic fluids has 
been in progress for many years and certain fluids less fla.rmnable 
than conventional fluids have been developed, this branch of the 
research cannot be considered closed. Materials considered to date 
either are not entirely suitable or have not had 8ufficent develop-
ment effort put on them to demonstrate completely their practicability. 
Resea.rch should be contim:ed until a serviceable and practical 
material is evolved and used. 
As part. of a consideration of methods of reducing fire hazards 
by using les6 flammable liquids, a discussion of the status of fire 
extinguishing is appropriate. The investigations by the Civil 
Aeronautics Administ.ration, the Bureau of ]\.eronautics, the U. S. Air 
Forees, and private research laboratories have already made important 
contributions to the knowledge on this subject. An analysis of the 
results indicates that a better understanding of the basic chemistry 
of fire-extinguishing agents is sti ll needed. Researc}: on the 
influence of aqueous solutions of certain salts in small concentra-
tions on the combustion process has indicated that the fire-· 
extinguisbing action was not wholly one of cooling or oxygen 
dilution, but 1S explained on the basis of the salt influenCing 
the combustion process. The unexplained difference between the 
effectiveness of various extinguishing agents indicates that further 
information js necessary in order to establish the influence of 
various substances on the chain reactions that occur during combus-
tion. Fundamental investigations are necessary to determjne the 
physical and c}:emical properties of fire-extinguishing agents 
required to previde maximuIt cooling and blanketing action. Parallel 
development of tecr..niques for reli~ble and immediate detection of 
fire or combustible mixtures is also necessary. 
Thus far the discussion ba.s beer. concerned with the character-
istics of flammable liquids as they relate to the fire problem. 
Also vital t o the solution of the fire problelL js an understanding 
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of the ignition sources. An analysis of existing literature shows 
that the exhaust system of the airplane may be the single most 
dangerous ignition source, particularly in a crash or following a 
major engine failure, at which times combustible vapor and liquids 
are freely exposed to the hot surfaces. Although some information 
is available in the literature, further investigations of techniques 
for cooling of the exhaust- disposal system are necessary. Further 
data relating the ignitibility of gasoline or oil to the temperature 
of hot exhaust pipes as a function of the air flow over the pipe 
are necessary before exhaust systems may be adequately deSigned. 
It must be admitted, however, that other ignition sources, such 
as residual flame in cylinders, other hot engine parts, and 
electrical-system failures may have started some of the fires that 
have been attributed to the exhaust system. It is important that 
the knowledge on these sources of ignition be extended so that 
necessary remedial measures may be established. 
The origin and propagation of fires resulting from mal-
functioning or major failures of engines or accessories is being 
investigated by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. This research 
has already provided much information on the ignition sources and 
the nature of the spread of fires in the airplane, particularly as 
the hazard manifests itself in flight. Additional detailed informa-
tion on the ignition characteristics of the airplane's inflammables 
in conjunction with the airplane's ignition sources is needed. 
Some of these data may be obtained in a laboratory simulation of 
the airplane environment. It 1s recognized that some phases of 
this work are already under way in the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 
Further necessary information on the origin and propagation of 
fires occurring in accidental airplane crashes could be obtained 
from intentional airplane crashes. The same sequence of crash 
tests as those used to prove or to disprove the safety features 
of low-volatility fuel and other remedial measures should suffice 
for this purpose. In these crashes, visual and photographic 
observations should be made and data recorded on temperature 
histories in the critical zones of the aircraft. Detailed observa-
tions on a series of crashes should advance the knowledge on ignition 
and propagation of fires. 
Fuel tanks that reduce the splash and spread of fuel in a crash 
offer an alternate or complementary solution to the problem of 
reducing the probability of ignition and the rate of spread of fire. 
The Civil Aeronautics Administration is working on the development 
of fuel tanks that have an increased crash resistance. Creative 
0) 
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effort should be continued toward the discovery of fuel tank config-
urations and methods of construction by which the fuel can be con-
tained after a crash. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The foregoing discussion is concerned with two major fundamental 
variables in the fire problem, combustibles and ignition sources, in 
the belief that a significant reduction in aircraft fire hazard is 
to be obtained by dealing appropriately with them. In conclusion, 
mention must be made of other and certainly important considerationd 
in the over-all problem of fire safety, such as general airplane 
layout, aircraft design detail, and service, maintenance, and 
operational practices. 
Layout of the airplane to provide maximum distance between the 
fuel and the engine, which is believed to be the principal ignition 
source, may lower the incidence of fIres. The mounting of fuel 
tanks at the tips of the wings is an example of a possible layout. 
Refinement of detail airplane design with particular emphasis on 
fire hazard should lead t o a safer airplane . Attention might be 
directed to such things as separating combustibles and ignition 
sources, exhaust system, plumbing, drains and ventilators, and 
electrical equipment. Application in design practice should be 
made of known safety measnres to an even greater extent than is 
being made at present. ThiS, of course, applies equally to 
serVice, maintenance, and operational practices. The tackling of 
many minor details will, as has frequently been pointed out, aid 
materially in solving the major problem. 
The ultimate reduction of the fire hazard will not result 
from the application of any single improvement, but will come 
frolfl em integration into the airplane design and flight operation 
of new ideas and methods, many of which remain to be explored. 
Flight Propuls ion Research Laboratory, 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
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TABLE I - ACCIDENTS SEVERE ENOUGH TO COMPLEl'EL Y 
WASH OUT AIRPLANE 
Fire following crash No fire following crash 
Date Total Fatalities Date Total Fatalities 
aboard aboard 
2- 4-46 4 4 1-31-46 21 21 
3- 3-46 27 27 :=;-29-46 4 0 
4-24-46 3 3 7-20-46 4 0 
5 - 16-46 27 27 7-25-46 5 0 
8 - 9-46 6 4 7-31-46 5 0 
8 -2S-46 2 2 8-21-46 25 2 
9- .'1 -46 21 20 9- 9-46 1 0 
9- 7-46 4 4 10-17-46 13 13 
10- 3-46 39 39 10-19-46 '7 3 J 
10- 8-46 47 2 10-21-46 1 1 
10-11-46 26 0 11- 9-46 18 0 
10-12-46 8 0 11-11-46 20 2 
11-13-46 11 11 11-21-46 2 0 
12-24-46 12 12 12- 4-46 17 0 
12-28-46 2 2 12-14-46 5 0 
12-28-46 23 13 12-17-46 7 7 
12-31-46 5 5 12-24-46 45 0 
12-28-46 21 2 
Total 267 175 or Total 217 51 or 
66 percent 24 percent 
1 
'----.-.-.~-.----------- .. -.. -~~--j 
42 NACA RM No. E8B18 
TABLE II - ACCIDENTS SEVERE ENOUGH TO HAVE AT 
LEAST ONE FATALITY 
Fire f ollowing crash No fire following crash 
Date Total Fatall t ies rate Total Fatalities 
aboard aboar d 
2- 4-46 4 4 1- 6-46 II 3 
3- 3-46 27 27 1- 3l-46 21 21 
4-24-46 3 3 8- 21 -46 2::; 2 
5- 16-46 27 27 10- 17-46 13 13 
8 - 9-46 6 4 10-19-46 3 3 
8 -25-46 2 2 10- 21-46 1 1 
9 - 5-46 21 20 ll- ll -46 20 2 
9 - 7-46 4 4 12 -17-46 7 7 
10- 3-46 39 38 12-28-46 21 2 
10- 8 -46 47 2 
11-13-46 II 11 
12 - 24 -46 12 12 
12-c'8-46 2 2 
12 - 28-46 23 13 
12 - 31-46 5 5 
Total 233 175 or Total 122 54 or 
75 percent 44 per cent 
---- -- ~-- ------ - - ------
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TABLE III - ACCIDENTS SEVERE ENOUGH TO CAUSE FATALITIES 
UP TO TWO-THIRDS OF PEOPLE INVOLVED 
Fire follQwing crash No fire following crash 
Date Total Fatalities Date Total Fatalities 
aboard aboard 
8- 9-46 6 4 1- 6-46 11 3 
10- 8-46 47 2 8-21-46 25 2 
12-28-46 23 13 11-11-46 20 2 
12-28-46 21 2 
Total 76 19 or Total 77 9 or 
25 percent 12 percent 
TABLE IV - ACCIDENTS HAVING AT LEAST ONE FATALITY AND 
AT LEAST ONE SURVIVOR 
Fire following crash No fire following crash 
Date Total Fatalities Date Total Fatalities 
aboard aboard 
8- 9-46 6 4 1- 6-46 11 3 
9- 5-46 21 20 8-21-46 25 2 
10- 8-46 47 2 11-11-46 20 2 
12-28-46 23 13 12-28-46 21 2 
Total 97 39 or Total 77 9 or 
40 percent 12 percent 
-~ ~ ~ - - ----.. ~ - -- - -- ~ - ~ ~ -- - - - - - -- -
44 
No fire, 
80 percent 
N AC A RM No. EB BIB 
Crasbes followed 
by fire, 
15 percent 
Accidents caused 
by fire in 
flight, 5 percent 
Figure 1. - Percentage of t otal air-carrier accidents for 1946 in which fire was involved. 
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Figure 2. - Comparison of deaths attributed to fire with total deaths in air-carrier 
accidents for 1946. 
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